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Introduction 
The recent events in politics and economics in the world have an ambiguous effect on 
the international trade development of the Russian Federation. In many areas of cooperation, 
restrictions due to EU countries sanctions are imposed on trade and economic relations, 
which adversely affect the internal economic situation of the state and the ways for the 
further development of the economy. 
Baltic countries always played a unique role in relations with Russia. After the fall of 
the Soviet Union Baltic countries is a great example of the statement that economic 
cooperation can be developed even in the face of political controversy. The relevance of the 
research topic is that Baltic countries due to its geographical location are a key intermediator 
between Europe and Russia in terms of trade. It is obvious that sanctions affected trade 
connections in a region. But what is still under consideration is a measure of the impact of 
sanctions on Baltic countries export to Russia and Russian export to Baltic countries. 
The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate the impact of sanctions on a Russian-Baltic 
trade. 
The author takes into account that sanctions impact is manifold and combined from 
such variables as economic decline, oil price, exchange rate, the decline in purchasing power 
and some other. Within the format on BA thesis is impossible to separate all those effects. 
The focus will be on areas, which are items of Baltic countries sanctions and Russian contra-
sanctions.  
The result of the research could be used for the prediction of further steps of both 
parties in this question and the risk assessment of participating in international projects 
related to the Russian Federation and Baltic countries for potential investors. The tasks of the 
bachelor thesis are as follows: 
 To define the nature and essence of economic sanctions. 
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 To explain the scope of sanctions  between Russia and Baltic countries 
 To study previous researches regarding Russian-Baltic trade 
 To explain the dynamics of Russian-Baltic trade after the implementation of 
sanctions. 
 To conduct case studies on companies which are active in Russian-Baltic trade 
The relevance of the topic of work is at the peak of interest due to the fact, that 
sanctions against Russia are currently imposed. This topic provokes lively discussions, both 
in Russian and in Baltic countries media, starting in 2014 and up to today. The main question 
is the assessment of damage to trade caused by sanctions and, of course, the possibility of 
maximizing its reduction. In the same time, the research gap is that the impact of sanctions on 
the trade between Russia and Baltic countries is not studied deeply enough. 
The first section of the work shows the analysis of the scientific researches on the 
issues of sanctions, reasons for its implementation, and particular reasons in the case of 
Russia-Baltic. In addition, there is an overview of other scholars who worked on this topic.  
The second section is the empirical part of a bachelor thesis. It consists of the analysis 
of the statistics and qualitative research. Data for statistics will be collected from the 
Observatory of the Economy Complexity (OEC), based on data from United Nations (UN) 
Comtrade Database. The author will use the Comparative method in order to conduct the 
analysis. Data for qualitative research will be collected via interviews with persons who 
represent companies, which are participating in trade between Baltic countries and Russia. In 
the end, the author explains the hypothesis, one would like to proof in bachelor thesis and 
predictions regarding it. 
Keywords for this bachelor thesis: sanctions, trade, Russia, Baltic countries, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, import, export. 
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1. Rationale and content of economic sanctions in Russian-Baltic trade 
1.1 Defining sanctions 
For further research, sanctions should be defined and the way how other scholars 
understand them. According to James M. Lindsay (1986), trade sanctions can be defined as 
measures in which one country (the initiator) publicly suspends a major portion of its trade 
with another country (the target) to attain political objectives. What is important to 
understand is that the author considers sanctions as a political rather than an economic tool. 
In that line sanctions is a way how one party promotes its own interests. 
This idea is also extended in the article written by Peter A. van Bergeijk (2009). 
According to the author, sanctions are built upon two basic statements. First, sanctions are 
aimed to cut off the target country of (part of) the gains it experiences from international 
trade and investment. Second, this threat will affect the target’s behavior. In other words, 
economic sanctions reduce welfare in the target country in order to force a change in its 
behavior. Sanctions can take many forms: tariffs, export controls, embargoes, import bans, 
travel bans, freezing assets, cutting aid, and blockades; all of which (with the exception of 
blockages) being legal barriers to trade. 
As a “party”, one can understand not only a specific country but also groups of 
countries or unions as well, for example, the European Union (EU). A tricky moment is that 
different countries have different interests even if they part of one union. A situation in which 
sanctions hit not only the target but also some initiators as well might take a place. That leads 
to a possibility of pseudosanctions – sanctions without any effects on a target, the aim of 
which is to signal solidarity of all participants of a union. To avoid this, sanctions become 
more specific-oriented, otherwise known as targeted or smart sanctions, aimed to harm 
particularly vulnerable points of an opponent (Portela, 2012). 
7 
 
 
There is also another approach to the understanding of sanctions. As it was mentioned 
previously initiator could be not only a country but an organization as well, for example, the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). This organization evaluates sanctions as measures for the 
responsible party in case of the suspension of concession between its participants 
(Charnovitz, 2001). The point is that rather than a political tool for own interest protection, 
sanctions might be considered as a punishment mechanism. 
Sanctions take a place of an instrument of influence in foreign policy, act as an 
alternative to the use of force, and are used to strengthen positions in the negotiation process. 
Economic sanctions are applied to coercive actions on the part of individual states, in the 
framework of the fulfillment of the requirements of the countries that are initiating the 
imposition of sanctions. Often there have been cases of the use of sanctions by the UN 
Security Council. 
The UN Charter provides a clear framework for the use of types and methods of 
coercion. Prohibits states from using or threatening to use force against each other. The 
article 41 of chapter VII of the UN charter provides for a complete or partial break in 
economic relations. It is worth noting that this type of measures qualifies as an economic 
sanction. Along with this, mechanisms are created for circumventing sanctions or ways to 
mitigate their impact on the stability of the national economy. (UN charter, n.d.) 
 Most often, the application of sanctions becomes the subject of divergence of ethical 
and regulatory views between the objects and the initiators of sanctions. The initiators apply 
sanctions to legitimate coercion to fulfill international obligations or to comply with certain 
norms. Countries subject to sanctions perceive them as a threat to the security of their nation. 
The concept of sanctions is quite broad and could be explained in different ways, but 
based on these five articles it could be said that sanctions are political and/or economic 
measures that prohibit or restrict some aspect of relations between two or more parties. The 
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purpose of sanctions is to force the targeted party to change their decision or opinion related 
to one or several particular questions.  
 
1.2 Nature and the scope of sanctions between Russia and Baltic countries. 
In a line with the topicality of the thesis, the author will proceed with the economic 
aspect of sanctions, but in the same time, the political side cannot be ignored as it refers to 
reasons for Baltic countries sanctions and Russian contra-sanctions as well as it might explain 
actions made by both parties in terms of international trade. That is why before the procedure 
with Russian-Baltic sanctions case one should clearly understand how international trade is 
defined in terms of thesis.  
According to Trent J. Bertrand, Maurice Allais, Bela Balassa, Romney Robinson and 
Paul Wonnacott (2019), international trade is economic transactions of both goods and 
services between two or more countries. The reason behind international trade is to fulfill the 
country with those products that the country is not able to produce or produce with low 
capacity or to exchange them for those items that it produces more than enough. Such 
transactions in combination with other economic policies tend to increase the standard of 
living of a nation and economic growth. 
A characteristic feature of modern economic growth is a high level of international 
competition and uncertainty due to ongoing structural transformation of developing country 
(Kuznetz, 1971). In such conditions, enterprises and both governments need to develop a 
concept for their development that meets the requirements of the external environment. And 
sanctions can break these connections that is why it is so important to measure its impact on 
trade. 
Perhaps, European Union sanctions against Russia pretends to be one of the most 
discussed topics worldwide. But one should clearly understand that those sanctions against 
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Russia are not just one event but a set of multiple actions from all countries of the EU, 
including Baltic countries (Gavrilenko, 2016). Those sanctions that were applied in 2014, 
were modified and extended, besides the implementation of new ones. In that line author, 
define Baltic countries sanctions against Russia as EU sanctions against Russia. One should 
also take into account Russian respond to those actions, including contra-sanctions and 
import substitution. That is why, before the analysis of literature, reasons for sanctions and 
key events regarding this topic should be studied.  
  Due to the sanctions imposed by the countries of the European Union against the 
Russian Federation in connection with the annexation of the Crimea and the escalation of the 
conflict in Ukraine, the economic balance has changed throughout the world (Stolbovskaya, 
2015).  In March 2014, EU countries adopted three groups of economic sanctions against 
Russia, which was connected with the events in Ukraine.  
The first group includes financial sanctions, i.e. reduction of investment in the 
Russian economy: cessation of lending to a number of large Russian banks and corporations 
for a period of more than one month and a ban on the purchase of their shares and bonds; 
banning investment in infrastructure, transport, telecommunications, and energy sectors. 
Those sanctions were applied by the EU council decision № 512 (2014) and council 
regulation № 833(2014). As an example, one can name restrictions for 5 main Russian banks 
which are: Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Vnesheconombank, and Rosselkhozbank. 
The second group includes a ban on the supply of high-tech equipment for 
infrastructure projects, as well as for the extraction of oil, gas, and minerals, and a ban on the 
export of armed equipment to Russia. As a result of the sanctions, business ties between 
industrial enterprises of Western countries and Russia have been reduced. This group of 
sanctions was applied with the EU council decision № 659 (2014) and council regulation № 
960 (2014). Under those restrictions, 3 main oil producers of Russia were blacklisted which 
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are: Rosneft, Transneft, and Gazprom. Persons investing in the energy sector in Russia were 
also blacklisted. (RIA News, 2014).  
The third group provided for restrictions on business relations of Russian companies 
with EU. By that one can understand personal sanctions that are targeted on specific 
individuals and/or companies, and exists in a way of blacklist against which imposed certain 
sanctions. Those sanctions were applied in a line with EU council decision № 145 (2014) and 
council regulation № 269 (2014). At the same time, the imposed sanctions constantly 
supplemented and changed, through changes in relevant sanction lists.  
The response to the sanctions mentioned above was the imposition by Russia of a ban 
on imported agricultural products, raw materials and food from countries, which 
implemented sanctions. (Zaernuk, & Alavifar, 2015) Those actions confirmed by Russian 
federation presidential decree № 560 (2014) and Russian Federation government decree 
№791 (2014).  An important role in this situation was played by import substitution, which in 
Russia is considered as a type of economic strategy, the goal of which is to protect domestic 
producers by replacing imported goods and technologies with products of national 
production. Figure 1 shows the dynamics of the share of imports in the volume of the retail 
trade in the Russian Federation. And what one can note is that there is a trend for a decrease 
in import starts from years 2013 -2014 when the first sanctions and both contra-sanctions 
took a place.
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Figure 1. The share of imports in the volume of commodity resources of the retail trade in 
Russia (%). 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the Russian federal custom service site (2019). 
There are a couple of trends, which can be noticed in that case. Firstly, EU sanctions are 
rather diversified in contrast with Russian sanctions. Starts from simple - prohibition of entry 
and transit, and freezing of the assets of individuals, to more serious sectoral sanctions in the 
banking, defense, and energy sectors.  
In the same time, Russian sanctions are oriented on particular products and items, rather than 
on whole sectors of EU countries economies. The possible reason behind is wider territorial 
coverage of EU sanctions as they involve not only the entire territory of the EU but 
potentially the whole world because of their application for all persons from the EU, 
wherever they are. Russia does not have an opportunity for such a while spread of its 
sanctions and concentrates on vulnerable points of trade with the EU. 
1.3 Overview of literature on the impact of sanctions regarding trade in Baltic region. 
The relevance of this topic is that all EU countries applied the same sanctions, the 
impact of those sanctions and Russian contra-sanctions on trade might differ from country to 
country. But why the trade between Russia and Baltic states is so important?  Baltic countries 
previously could be compared with a bridge between Europe and Russia. These relations goes 
deep down in history, as Russia always was oriented on access to Baltic sea. The best 
confirmation is multiple conflicts with Sweden and Poland for that region through the history.  
Nowadays, the situation is that through Estonia passes the shortest way from Europe 
to the East, while ports of Latvia and Lithuania plays a significant role in trade between EU 
and Russia (Khmilev, 2010). The current situation caused lots of different points of view on 
the impact of sanctions on international trade between Baltic countries and Russia. The 
explanation is that the whole situation is highly affected by the political aspect of that 
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question. As an example one can mention, that in 2016 Baltic countries leaders confirmed 
that sanctions will be held until Ukrainian conflict will be resolved. (Antonov, 2016).  In 
order to systemize information about the studies that precede this research, Table 1 was 
compiled: 
Table 1 
Articles on impact of sanctions regarding Russian-Baltic trade  
Author, year Country Main findings 
Kashparov & Smirnova, 2016 Russia Sanctions did not have a significant negative 
impact on the Russian economy, but become 
a challenge for EU countries. 
Kovalev, Falchenko & 
Savelyeva, 2019 
Russia The current situation in Russian-Baltic trade 
sector after sanctions strongly affected by 
internal political decisions. 
Nureev & Petrakov, 2016 Russia Good possibility of import substitution for 
Russia under the current economic 
conditions, which is a serious threat for 
countries of EU who trade with Russia.  
Fedorov, 2018 Russia Despite existing decrease in a trade of a 
region, both parties might be interested in 
further development 
Dreyer & Popescu, 2014 European 
Union 
There is no winner from the current sanction 
regime and all parties have to find a 
compromise. 
Zygimantas, 2014 European 
Union 
Contra-sanctions is a problem for Baltic 
states as they do not have an opportunity to 
rearrange its export to other countries 
Oja, 2015 European 
Union 
Real impact of the Russian sanctions on a 
trade in the Baltic sea region is lower than it 
seems to be. 
Veebel & Markus, 2018 European 
Union 
Sanctions had local effect on particular 
sectors of economy of Baltic countries but 
not significant in general 
Oxenstierna, 2018 European 
Union 
Sanctions and Contra-sanctions seriously 
affected Baltic countries economies and 
force them to redirect its export on other 
countries. 
Brown, 2019 US Russia-Baltic trade in a quite unstable 
position due to Russian manipulation with 
oil and gas prices. 
Changwei, Xiaojia & Lu, 
2019 
China Sanctions forced Russia to diversify trade 
routes to East. 
   
Source: compiled by the author. 
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The article by Kashparov and Smirnova (2016) discusses the economic consequences 
for the Russian economy of the sanctions of the European Union and the counter-sanctions of 
Russia. It is intuitive, that being written as a work that represents the opinion of Russian 
political institutes, the negative effect of sanctions was almost minor, and however, the rather 
different situation is with EU. While in general countries of EU were not harmed by sanctions 
a lot, those who were concentrated on the agricultural sector of the trade like Lithuania and 
Latvia were suffering a lot and started to search for the alternative entrance to Russian market 
via Belarus. The author collected statistical data from Russian official websites, concentrated 
on general export and import numbers before and after sanctions and measured changes via 
percentage in GDP, using the comparative method of analysis. The comparative method is a 
method for analyzing objects, which compares the new state of an object with the old state or 
compares the state of one object with another, with which a comparison may be appropriate. 
(Collier, 1993). The comparative analysis is one of the main methods used in economic 
research. 
The idea of a minor effect of sanctions on a Russian economy even more extended in 
an article by Kovalev, Falchenko & Savelyeva (2019). Authors provide links between 
political and economic decisions and at the same time explains that political might and will 
affect economically as more important. In case of Russia, which marked import substitution 
instead of international trade as a key factor of a new Russian strategy, despite the possibility 
for rather high numbers government prefers to increase import from the other countries of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) even if it is not the best option from the economic side of 
a question. In this paper, the author concentrated on agricultural sector export numbers 
among countries of EAEU. While the author does not concentrate on Baltic, it explains that 
the increase in numbers between EAEU members related to a decrease in the same sectors 
with those countries who implemented sanctions against Russia and its substitution. It could 
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be said that the author indirectly refers to countries of the EU. The author implements 
statistical analysis method as well as the comparative method, and also a graphic method, for 
the representative explanation of EAEU structure. Graphical method refers to the method of 
data aggregation at the stage of the primary data analysis. A graphic is a drawing showing the 
relationship of data with geometric images and graphics means. Graphs allow presenting 
statistical data in a visual form. 
Another article by Russian authors Nureev and Petrakov (2016) analyzed the impact 
of international economic sanctions on the Russian economy and trade development, the 
reasons for their occurrence and particular spheres where they take a place. The possibilities 
of import substitution in the current economic conditions were considered as well. Authors 
divided the impact of sanctions on 5 sectors of the economy. What differs these Authors from 
previous Russian authors is that they try to look on this situation from both parties (Russia 
and EU). As for the disadvantages of this paper, one can note that the author does not 
separate Baltic countries from the EU and rather analyses trade between Russia and a whole 
EU. Authors tried to define both the pros and cons of import substitution and export-oriented 
economic development, as well as issues of economic security and sustainable development 
of Russia are considered. In their conclusion, they attempted to formulate both pessimistic 
and optimistic forecasts for further development of the existing situation.  
Surprisingly, in 4 years after the implementation of sanctions, some researchers still 
believe that the current crisis in a trade is a temporary one. According to Fedorov (2018), the 
existing situation in a region has 2 sides. On the one hand, one cannot deny a decrease in 
trade between Russia and Baltic countries after the implementation of sanctions in 2014, due 
to the complexity of trade and long history of relations between those parties. But on the 
other hand, that complexity is an argument why the existing situation might be improved 
further on. According to the author, both parties have a common interest in the development 
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of a region and trade in it. In order to confirm his theory, the author analyzes both 
international relations and trade development between Russia and Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania since the crush of a Soviet Union. In this article, the author uses statistical data 
analyses via a comparative method. 
Looking from the opposite side, Dreyer and Popescu (2014) put the main question of 
their research paper as the effectiveness of sanctions against Russia. The article defined 
reasons for economic sanctions of EU against Russia. Analyzes the policy of the Central 
Bank of Russia in terms of sanctions that have escalated the economic problems of Russia. 
But besides financial aspects what authors want to say is that sanctions might and probably 
will lead to loss of the Russian market for Western partners, as countries like China might 
take their places on a market during the period of sanctions.  In this article, the author does 
not diversify Baltic countries and the EU as all of them its members. After the definition of 
the main positive and negative aspects of that question, the conclusion is that there is no clear 
answer to that question due to the mixed picture and additional time requires. 
The previous article leaves a question of how Baltic states should rearrange its export 
from Russia without an answer. According to Zygimantas (2014) that might be a serious 
challenge as in some key sectors of economies and trade, Baltic countries are not competitive 
enough in contrast with other countries of the EU. The author also remarks that it is not the 
first time Baltic states faced with restrictions from Russia. As an example author mentioned a 
ban on dairy products of Lithuania in 2013 as well as some others. Multiple data collected 
from Eurostat in order to provide precise numbers for changes in trade sectors. Besides 
comparative analysis, one might also note that the author converts information into multiple 
figures and tables in order to systemize the information and make easy – to – read for further 
researchers.  
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The article wrote by Oja (2015) looks on a situation with changes in a trade in a 
region as well. As Russia had to answer on sanctions against it, the government also 
implemented sanctions against the EU and USA. Those actions for sure had an impact on 
Russian trade with Baltic countries, but one should define what is the value of these changes. 
What one should understand is that sanctions did not cause structural changes in trade inside 
the Baltic region. The author concentrated on the export and import of products and services 
regarding the GDP level. What differs author from other papers is that in order to diversify 
export products and re-exported products author use special data, called Trade in Value 
Added (TiVA). With the use of this data, it is possible to exclude re-exported products out of 
calculations in order to make numbers fairer. 
Veebel and Markus (2018) in their paper agreed with the previous researcher, but in 
the same time, they set up a hypothesis that small open economies with a few external 
markets are extremely vulnerable for quick changes. Authors used statistical analyses as well 
as descriptive and comparative methods. The main accent made on import and export 
numbers between Russia and each country of the Baltic States. In addition, the author 
analyzes its relation to GDP changes. In the end, the author sums up that despite in 
agricultural sector Baltic countries faced with troubles, in general effect was not so crucial. 
Overall, authors conclude that in a short term situation will save status-quo, as currently, both 
sides are not interested in the development of trade relations. After all, authors also made 
predictions regarding further development of relations between Baltic countries and Russia in 
the line of relations between EU and Russia.  
One has to note that even inside EU there are opposite views on a current situation 
and its further development. According to Oxenstierna (2018) as Baltic countries had the 
highest shares of export to Russia in comparison with other countries of the EU before the 
implementation of sanctions. Due to the relatively small size of economies of Baltic countries 
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restrictions and sanctions in a trade with Russia become a serious challenge for them. Those 
actions in the end either forced them to make structural changes in export and import or 
rearrange its trade to other countries. As an argument for the defense of the idea of structural 
changes author use relevant statistics from Eurostat and analyze it via the comparative 
method.  
According to Brown (2019) substitution of Baltic ports on Russian made by the 
Russian government cannot be fully completed due to the geographical location of Baltic 
ports. As an example port of Ventspils besides it is one of the biggest in the whole region, it 
is also ice-free which provides an opportunity for work for the whole year. However, the 
situation in total is unstable due to Russian geopolitical actions. The author investigates links 
between Russian actions against post-soviet countries (including Baltic states) and further 
perspectives for development. Instead of deep investigation in numbers and economic reasons 
for that situation, the author concentrates on political aspects of that question via the analysis 
and synthesis of the similarities, differences, and patterns across that topic. 
Finally, Changwei, Xiaojia, and Lu (2019) provide a rather different point of view on 
that situation. According to article sanctions implemented by the EU and US left no choice 
for Russia except turn on the East. Another important aspect is that despite massive economic 
losses turn to the East was not improvisation of a government in order to save the economy. 
This plan appeared in 2008 after Russian-Georgian conflict, because after the Russian 
government understands that confrontation with the EU and US might take a place further on. 
Authors concentrated on Gas and Oil sectors, while those seem to be key ones for the Russian 
economy. Authors use statistical analyses of data regarding oil, gas, and its changes in 
numbers from year to year. What one can understand from this paper as Russia will develop 
its trade with China, it will lead to a decrease in trade with EU and Baltic countries as a part 
of it. 
18 
 
 
The main problem one can note from the literature review is a lack of scientific papers 
regarding trade between Baltic countries and Russia. Most authors prefer to measure this 
trade in a broad way as part of the trade between Russia and the EU. Another problem is that 
different authors had quite different opinions regarding outcomes of sanctions. That depends 
on how the author measure both political and economic factors influence on the situation. 
This is also related to dimensions in data from different databases taken by different 
researchers.  
Despite multiple outcomes that the authors mentioned, authors agree with each other 
in some similarities. The initial situation highly influenced by political decisions made by the 
Russian government. Even if from the economical perspective some decisions seem to be 
non-logical or at least less profitable than it could be, actions are aimed to support 
government position regarding its political vector. As for the Baltic countries, they have to 
follow unite political course of the European Union. The point is that some decisions seem to 
be harmless for key countries of the EU while for small countries of Baltic they provide extra 
expenses and losses.  
Overall, the Russian government considers those actions as a threat for itself, which 
leads to non-logical and in some cases even paranoiac reactions and decisions, which disrupt 
trade linkages in the Baltic Sea region. All of it creates uncertainness in trade between Russia 
and Baltic countries and leave 2 main questions which go through the literature overview as a 
red line without solution and should be answered in this thesis. The first one, what is the 
current situation in trade between Russia and Baltic countries in terms of sanctions regime? 
Another question is what trade participants in Baltic and Russia should be ready for further 
on in the nearest future?  
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2. Impact of sanctions on Russian–Baltic trade 
2.1 Current situation in Russian-Baltic trade 
Before proceeding with the analyses, the method for analysis should be described. 
The model-specific approach to studying the trade include among others include aggregate 
demand-aggregate supply model (the AD-AS) or Trade in Value Added (TiVA). The first one 
is more of a theoretical macroeconomic textbook model, criticized for missing the empirical 
realism (Moseley, 2010). The TiVa model allows for finding net export that excludes re-
export from other countries of the European Union – important for the complex products 
parts of which were produced in other countries (Stehrer, 2012). However, one can note that 
the data set for TiVa model is only up to the year 2011. Which means that if the sanctions 
take a place only after the year 2014 than this data is irrelevant and not up to date, therefore 
the author will not use this model as well. 
In that line the author decided to use the comparative method for statistical analysis 
and one can note that most of the authors mentioned in the preceding chapter prefer to use the 
comparative method as well. The reason behind using the comparative method is that it is 
sometimes necessary to conduct an analysis which is to study complex, multidimensional and 
controversial objects requires serious analytical effort (Pickvance, 2005).  In that, the analysis 
should be complex, because it makes no sense to analyze separately objects, processes, and 
phenomena without a specific economic context. 
One can say that there is no isolated objects and processes in foreign trade 
(McDonald, 2012). No matter how original they are, between them always exists certain 
commonality, openness to each other and in the same time dependence of one from another. 
Each object is an element of a large system, were all interconnected with each other. 
Changing one part of the system leads to changes in its other parts. Therefore, the goal of the 
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comparative analysis is not so much to investigate the essence of particular objects of trade, 
how much is to find connections between separate objects. 
Therefore, when conducting a comparative analysis of any area it is considered not 
narrowly objective, but systematically, in interaction various objects (components) of the 
system. (Esser & Vliegenthart, 2017). Then it could be said that methodological foundations 
of comparative analysis are concentrated on identifying the nature of relationships, patterns 
of interaction between objects and economic phenomena. 
A comparative method for evaluating objects and phenomena consists of 4 steps (Vartiainen, 
2002): 
 The collection of all the information obtained. In this case, all data must be 
objective, accurate and demonstrable. 
 Processing of information. In other words, which information should be used. 
 Systematization of information. All data should be divided into different 
categories and give the collected material a structural look. 
 Interpretation of the data. Based on the analysis and comparison of information, 
specific conclusions are made 
For the first step author should define the data one will use. While studying the impact 
of sanctions on the trade one has to necessarily use the statistics available from the national 
agencies to estimate the volumes of import and export. It means that usually the main 
secondary data to be used are Russian and EU sources of statistics relevant to the topic.  
    Russian statistical data can be collected from the Russian federal state statistics or 
Rosstat, service that performs the functions of forming official statistical information on the 
social, economic, demographic and environmental situation of the country, as well as control 
and supervision functions in the field of state statistical activities in the Russian Federation 
(Rosstat, 2017).  What might be a challenge is a credit of trust to national statistics. Statistics 
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supposed to be the neutral representation of the situation but it might be only on a paper. 
According to Seninskiy (2017), after The Federal State Statistics Service was again 
subordinated to the Ministry of Economic Development from the Government of Russian 
Federation, the credit of trust to data might decrease as it might be more biased. 
 From the other side, one can choose national statistics services of Baltic countries, for 
example, Statistics Estonia  (SE, 2019). In that line, Eurostat pretends to have more 
variability and optionality regarding data. However, national statistics still valuable in case of 
some specific and precise data regarding a particular country. What proofs the quality of 
Eurostat data is that it received the European Foundation for Quality Management 
"Committed to Excellence" recognition in November 2016 (Eurostat, 2016). But in the same 
time, there is a high chance of no author contribution into the outcome using this data, as it is 
already has been used in previous researches regarding trade in the Baltic region (Oja, 2015; 
Veebel & Markus, 2018). 
Main source author has plans to use is the Observatory of Economic Complexity 
(OEC). This source was developed as a project of a master thesis of a student from the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). The main advantage is that it collects data 
from multiple independent sources and provide an easy-to-understand visual representation of 
international trade between countries (OEC, 2019). Another advantage is that due to it 
complexity OEC provides an understanding of mechanics of the economic development 
(Simoes & Hidalgo, 2011). One more reason behind using that database is that in the case of 
trade between the Baltic States and the Russian Federation the majority of economic moves 
are strongly affected by the political decisions. It means that the authors who chose to work 
with the national statistics have to take into consideration recent changes in international 
relations and local political events. Therefore, in this paper the author will focus on the 
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economic side of the trade, meanwhile, complete ignorance of the political aspects would 
lead to misleading conclusions.   
Once the dataset is defined, it should be described which data will be taken. In order 
to do that one should define key criteria in foreign trade. Foreign trade can be estimated using 
basic concepts of export, import, and foreign trade balance. 
Export is the quantity of goods exported from the country (Amadeo, 2019). Under the 
export one should understand export abroad of goods, technologies, services for their 
implementation on the foreign market. Objects of export can be goods produced in the 
country and goods imported into the country and processed in it. A special form of export is 
re-export, i.e. export of previously imported goods that have not been processed in this 
country (UN trade statistics, 2016). 
Import is the quantity of goods imported into a country from abroad (Amadeo, 2019). 
In other words, imports are the importation of goods, technologies, services for their 
implementation in the domestic market, as well as for transit to third countries. The import 
volume includes the return import from abroad of unprocessed domestic goods – reimport 
(UN trade statistics, 2016). 
Overall, the export operation of the country of sale equal to the import operation of 
the country of the purchaser. The fact of export and import of goods is confirmed in a 
moment of crossing the border and is reflected in customs and foreign trade statistics. In 
terms of analysis, that means that there is no need to search for data of the Russian Federation 
import from the Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania if one previously found data of export of the 
Baltic countries to Russia. Necessary to admit that in this thesis author will measure trade 
percentage from the side of Baltic countries. 
         One more important concept for the comparative analyses is the balance of foreign 
trade. The formula for the balance of foreign trade is the total value of export minus the total 
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value of import (Kenton, 2018). The balance of foreign trade can be positive or negative and 
rarely reduces to zero. A negative trade balance means the occurrence of a passive trade 
balance. And, on the contrary, the positive balance characterizes the active trade balance of 
the country. 
Further on, the author set up a timeline borders for the comparative analysis. The first 
package of sanctions take a place in the year 2014 that is why one should take data starts 
from the year before sanctions were implemented up to the one with the most recent data 
available. That means the information will be taken into account for the year 2013 up to 
2017, based on the chosen database. 
In addition, to work with data regarding changes in key criteria of international trade 
author also have to analyze structural changes in trade between Russia and Baltic countries. 
The idea in that line is to measure the impact of sanctions on the development of a trade in a 
region. The OEC database classified 21 groups of both export and import. 
In the same time, the author assumes there is no need to look at those criteria from the 
Russian side. The point is that as the percentage of export and import values of all 3 Baltic 
countries is rather low in comparison with some other trade partners of Russia, that is why 
this information might be interpreted in a wrong way, while author better should concentrate 
on the point of the view of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 
In order to systemize data regarding the export of Baltic countries to Russia, figure 2 
was compiled. The author combined export values to Russian federation for all 3 Baltic 
countries i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and made a graph model. What one can note is 
that after the implementation of sanctions in 2014 export values went down significantly. It 
could be said that Baltic countries lose not less than 1/3 of its exports to Russia. To be more 
precise than Estonia lose approximately 46% percent, Lithuania almost 34% while Latvia 
loses 31% of its export to Russia. Meanwhile, Zygimantas (2014) admitted that mainly 
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Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian products are not competitive for the rest of EU markets due 
to the low volume of capacity. That leads to a problem with the redirection of exports. 
 
Figure 2. Export from Baltic states to Russia from 2013 to 2017 in billion dollars ($) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the data from OEC (2019) 
If one compares all 3 Baltic countries than Estonia with the drop of a Russia as a 
destination for export from the first place  in 2013 to the third in 2017 lose 2 billion of dollars 
(bln) in total export value (OEC,2019) and one could assume that around half of it related to 
Russia looking back in figure 2. In contrast, Lithuania for the same period loses 1.7 bln. 
Contribution of Russian export in this fall is 78% of the total value. As for Latvia, Russia 
remained on the same second position in export, losses for the same period are only 0.6 bln 
and Russian impact in that line is around ¾ of the total value. Despite Latvia had much lower 
losses than other Baltic countries one should understand that at the same time Latvia had the 
lowest export numbers to Russia even before the implementation of sanctions. 
In the same time, before the evaluation of structural changes in the export of Baltic 
countries to Russia, the author also should measure the impact of Russian contra-sanctions. 
The question one might ask is what is the difference in the dynamics between those items of 
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Baltic States export to Russia that currently under those sanctions in compare with those that 
are not? Once again, according to Russian Federation presidential decree №560 (2014) and 
Russian Federation government decree №791 (2014) import of textile, animal products, and 
vegetable products from EU were banned for one year. Further on this ban was extended and 
still exists, however, the author has to mention that some products from this “stop-list” were 
allowed on a market, for example, frozen vegetables and beef but with limitations from 
Russian federation government decree №472 (2016). Meanwhile, such items as Machines 
and Chemical products were not included in the ban. As for the foodstuffs item, it was 
banned partially as such products as spirit drinks are not under the ban.  
To see the dynamics of these items, the author builds graphs for all 3 countries for the 
past 10 years from 2007 up to 2017. The author made a separate graph in figure 3 for 
machines as numbers for that item for Estonia and Lithuania are rather higher than any other 
item and leads to the problem with the visualization of data. 
 
Figure 3. The dynamics of Baltic countries export of machines item to Russia in 
millions of dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by the author based on data from OEC (2019) 
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One can note an outstanding role of machines item in Estonian and Lithuanian export 
to Russia starts from 2009 and a significant drop between 2014 and 2015 however, that drop 
could be explained not by Russian contra-sanctions but by sanctions of EU as a part of 
restrictions of technologies export. In the same time, the peak of that drop was in 2015 and so 
far export of machines start to grow up to the level that was before the implementation of 
sanctions. As for Latvia, those numbers in contrast with the other two countries is rather low, 
however, still, one can note the same increase and drop in numbers by years. 
In order to visualize comparison of other selected items of Estonian export to Russia 
that currently under the sanctions and those that do not figure 4 was compiled by the author 
in a way of a graph. 
 
Figure 4. The comparison of Estonian export to Russia of items which are under Russian 
sanctions with items that are not under sanctions in millions of dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by the author based on data from OEC (2019) 
Once again, the author will not take into account data for vegetable products, as it is 
not an important part of Estonian export to Russia. As for Animal products, one can note drop 
almost to zero starts from 2014, which goes along with the implementation of Russian contra-
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Foodstuffs Chemical products Vegetable products Animal products Textile
27 
 
 
sanctions. The same situation is with textile export with the drop from 2013 to 2017 almost 7 
times lower.  
As for the foodstuffs, that drop in export is less significant than in other items and 
could be explained by a partial ban of products referred to that group, from the Russian 
federation side. Fall in numbers for chemical products also not crucial for the industry, but 
with a note that drop in export started before the implementation of sanctions and so far one 
can note the growth in this item. 
Overall, the graph shows that drop in Estonian items of export to Russia that were 
under sanctions and Russian contra-sanctions was rather significant in comparison with items 
that were out of restrictions from both parties.  Looking back to previous years it is possible 
to say that before 2013 dynamics of all items were rather stable with a growing. In the same 
time, the author accepts that some drops in numbers of those items were before 2013 as well, 
but they were not so significant, which might refer to the idea of the strong impact of 
sanctions on Estonian export to Russia. 
The author compiled figure 5 in order to present the graph for selected items of 
Latvian export to Russia. Food items were not included in the graph as those numbers are 
much higher than any other item of Latvian export to Russia. However, according to data 
from OEC (2019), the author has to mention stable grow in that item numbers from 2009 
(153 mln of $) to 2013 (496 mln of $) and a significant drop from 2014 (488 mln of $) to 
2015 (258 mln of $). In the same time, starts from 2016 (213 mln of $) one can note again 
significant grow up to 2017 (376 mln of $), which refers to the idea that impact of Russian 
sanctions is partial on that item.  
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Figure 5. The comparison of Latvian export to Russia of items which are under Russian 
sanctions with items that are not under sanctions in millions of dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by the author based on data from OEC (2019) 
 One can note a couple of similarities with Estonian export to Russia. First of all, that 
Chemical products currently also show a tendency for a grow after a drop and already 
reached numbers that were in 2014. 
Another similarity is the same drop almost to zero of animal products export, however 
it less important for Latvian export and approximately on the same level of significance with 
vegetable products and textiles. They are important but not crucial aspects of Latvian export. 
The difference is that both vegetable and textile show the tendency for current grow up to the 
numbers which were before the implementation of Russian sanctions against EU, and that 
goes against the idea of the strong impact of sanctions on a Latvian export to Russia. In the 
same time, one can say that there was not any such a massive drop in numbers, besides drop 
in animal products export between 2011 and 2012, in past 10 years as after the 
implementation of sanctions. 
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Figure 6 is a visualization for selected items of Lithuanian export to Russia in a way 
of a graph, compiled by the author. 
 
Figure 6. The comparison of the Lithuanian export to Russia of items which are under 
Russian sanctions with items that are not under sanctions in millions of dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by the author based on data from OEC (2019) 
In the case of Lithuania, the export of animal products to Russia the same way with 
both Latvia and Estonia dropped almost to zero in compare with numbers before the 
implementation of Russian sanctions. Vegetable products, which used to be a crucial part of 
Lithuanian export to Russia, before the sanctions, fall down almost 7 times in comparison 
with numbers for 2013. One more item that is under the Russian sanctions is textile, also 
shows a drop with the numbers in 2013, however one can note a minor grow in compare with 
2016. 
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The current situation with foodstuffs export is quite debatable. On the one hand, 
current numbers are not so far from the highest numbers before the Russian sanctions. On the 
other hand, the author has to admit a significant drop between 2014 and 2016. Based on that 
data, possible to assume that once again impact of sanctions on that item is partial 
A rather different situation is with the Chemical products, as it was not under the 
sanctions. There was not any significant drop in that item export, moreover one can even say 
about stable growth with a minor stagnation between 2014 and 2016.  
Lithuania is an example of how sanctions might have a serious impact on the export 
of a country. In general, all items related to the Russian sanctions showed a significant drop 
in numbers after 2014, while those items that are not related to the sanctions or related 
partially demonstrates the tendency for a grow. 
Overall, there is not enough information based on that data to give a clear answer 
regarding the impact of sanctions on the export of Baltic countries to Russia. On the one 
hand, there are no doubts regarding the impact of sanctions on a Lithuanian export to Russia 
as well as on some items for all 3 countries such as machines or animal products. On the 
other hand, there are no certainties regarding the general impact of sanctions on a Latvian 
export to Russia and results for Estonia might be interpreted in both ways.   
What is more important, EU sanctions against Russia do not relate with particular 
items of trade and as it was mentioned previously diversified on 3 categories. Those sanctions 
that aimed at key sectors of Russian economy restricts items partially, only those products 
and technologies that used or might be for the military or energetic sector and in that line 
impact of EU sanctions should be evaluated via structural changes in export of Baltic 
countries in order to give a clear answer. 
As for structural changes in export of Estonia to Russia, Author compiled Appendix 
A. In order to calculate percentage difference between the year before the sanctions were 
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implemented and the latest year in data Author used simple formula: x = ((b-a)/a) * 100, 
where b is an item value for the year 2017, a is an item value for the year 2013 and x is a 
percentage difference.  Also, the author assumes that despite data were collected for all 21 
categories some of them is useless for assessment of structural changes due to minor value. 
In the case of Estonia, the author will not take not account such items as arts and 
antiques, precious metals, stone and glass, vegetable products, weapons, and wood products. 
One can note a decrease in almost all categories while animal and vegetable by-products 
increased on 41.57%, but that one is rather an exception from the total picture. Moreover, its 
contribution to total value cannot be highlighted as an important one.  In order to represent 
that data figure 7 was compiled by the author as a graph model, including key items in 
Estonian export and those items that start to grow significantly. 
 
Figure 7. Changes in the Estonian export to Russia in millions of dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by the author based on data from OEC (2019) 
As for the others in some of them, that fall was much more significant than in others 
like in animal hides, animal products, mineral products, paper goods, and textiles. The point 
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is that as those items lost more than ¾ of its value they hardly can be named as an important 
one for the export anymore, except textile, which even with the loss of 85% is still among the 
first third of main export items. The outcome that currently there are no structural changes in 
Estonian export to Russia as key items remained the same, while items which show a 
growing are not important for the economy, except chemical products, at least for now. 
Appendix B represents structural changes in export of Latvia to Russia. For Latvia, 
such items as animal and vegetable bi-products, animal hides, arts and antiques, footwear and 
headwear, instruments, miscellaneous, precious metals, and weapons are not crucial for 
export to Russia. Once again one can notice a total decrease in almost all items. As for the 
changes, significant fall was in animal products (-99.49%), mineral products (-92.88%) and 
wood products (-91.93). In analogy with Estonian export to Russia author compiled a Figure 
8 for visualization of data. 
 
Figure 8. Latvian export to Russia in millions of dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by the author based on data from OEC (2019) 
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
2013 2015 2017
Foodstuffs Machines Chemical products Transportation Wood products
33 
 
 
However, it cannot be said that those changes are structural as those items are not 
valuable enough for the export of Latvia to Russia. As an exception, one can name wood 
production, with the drop on -91.93%, which is 2013 used to be in top 5 export items. In the 
same time, average changes in percentage are lower on a contrast with Estonia which 
explains why Latvian total loss in export to Russia almost twice lower than in Estonia. It is 
also possible to say that Latvia passed a breakeven point in export with Russia in 2015 and 
currently slowly starts to restore number, which was before the implementation of sanctions. 
Data for analysis of changes in the structure of export to Russia for Lithuania 
presented in appendix C. From data for assessment, one can ignore the role of animal and 
vegetable bi-products, animal hides, arts and antiques, mineral products, precious metals, 
wood products and weapon.  The most significant changes took place in animal products (-
98.59%) and vegetable products (-84.52%). Both of them used to be crucial parts of 
Lithuanian exports to Russia. Instead of them, Lithuania increases export of chemical 
products (67.15%) and instruments (40.2%). Author to represent that numbers compiled 
Figure 9.
 
Figure 9. Lithuanian export to Russia in millions of dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by the author based on data from OEC (2019) 
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In that line, it could be said that Lithuania faced with structural changes of its export 
to Russia during the period of sanctions, even if it is restored the main item of an export 
(machines) on the same level with the one which was before sanctions were implemented. 
Overall, only Lithuania had to deal with structural changes regarding export to Russia, 
out of all Baltic countries, which probably explains why the contribution of Russian export in 
total fall of Lithuanian exports is around 78% of the total value. For other countries, those 
numbers are also high which shows the importance of that market for the export of Baltic 
countries and explains why it is so difficult to submit this market on another. One can also 
note that the middle point of a decline in export for all countries was between 2015 and 2016. 
Starting from that point export of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to Russia start to increase 
slowly, however yet it is too early to say that rather it is a breakpoint in the trade or just an 
exception in a tendency. 
Figure 10 represents the import of Baltic countries from Russia in 2013- 2017. In 
order to do that import values of all 3, Baltic countries i.e. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from 
Russian federation was collected and a graph model was made
 
Figure 10. Import of Baltic countries from Russia in 2013- 2017.  in billion dollars ($) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the data from OEC (2019) 
 The first thing one can note is the difference in values for Lithuania and 2 other 
countries of the Baltic region. For the year 2013, i.e. before sanctions took a place Lithuanian 
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numbers of import (9.07 bln) from Russia was approximately higher on 2/3 in compare with 
Estonia (3.54 bln) and Latvia (2.82 bln). That is why statistically; drop in imports from 
Russia to Lithuania was higher than others and it is approximately about 60% while for 
Estonia and Latvia it is 50% and 30% respectively.  
 Before sanctions, Russia was the largest importer for Lithuania with 26 % of total 
import, but up to 2017 Russian give up the first place to Germany. The total loss in import is 
-3.7 bln, which is lower than the loss in import from Russia only (-5.44 bln). That means 
Lithuania actually find other importers to cover occurred gap in a field of trade. As for 
Estonia, Russia as well gives up the place of the main importer to Estonia to Germany in 
2017 with only 10% of a share. The total loss in that case almost the same with Lithuania, 
which is 3.6 bln but the share of the Russian import here is a little more than a half.  For 
Latvia, on the contrast with the other Baltic States, Russia before sanctions were not the main 
importer. In 2017 even with a decrease in a total share situation remained stable and Russia 
still, keeps the position of a second importer to Latvia, while for that period loss in total 
import was 2.1 bln. Share of Russian import changes in total import loss is 41%, which is 
lower than in other Baltic countries.   
Appendix D represents data for the assessment of structural changes in Lithuanian import 
from Russia. The author will not take into consideration such items as animal hides, animal 
products, arts and antiques, footwear and headwear, instruments, miscellaneous, paper goods, 
precious metals, stone and glass, textiles, vegetable products, and weapons as their 
percentage in import is rather small. However, one should notice a strange trend in a rapid 
increase of the share of animal products (183%), while Lithuania used to export animal 
products to Russia in rather high amounts. The explanation is that by animal products one 
may understand different products. In that case, Russia imports to Lithuania fish, while 
Lithuania used to export milk production (OEC,2019). Another rapid grow is in wood 
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products (108,4%), that information presented in Figure 11, which the author made as a graph 
model.
 
Figure 11. Lithuanian import from Russia in million dollars ($) 
Source: Compiled by author based on the data from OEC (2019) 
   As for losses in percentage, the author assumes that mineral products import should 
be outlined from the rest as its percentage in import far away from any other item. And fall 
on – 64.91% in this item plus significant loss in transportation on -88.13% give enough 
evidence to assume the existence of massive structural changes in import from Russia. The 
reasons behind according to Zygimantas (2014) is that currently Lithuania implementing 
different programs such as “LitPol Link” in order to reduce the dependence of a country from 
Russia.   
In the case of Estonia author compiled appendix E for assessment of the existing 
situation in import from Russia. Firstly, one should ignore such items as animal and vegetable 
bi-products, animal hides, animal products, arts and antiques, foodstuffs, footwear and 
headwear, instruments, miscellaneous, paper goods, plastics and rubbers, precious metals, 
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stone and glass, textiles, vegetable products, and weapons. Despite it is more than 2/3 of all 
items, their share in import is relatively small. As for the other items, once again the 
outstanding role of mineral products in the Baltic States import from Russia confirmed. 
Import changes in Estonia pretty much the same with Lithuanian, the same item in a plus as 
wood products (5,67%) and the same items in a minus as transportation (-69.19). The only 
difference is a grow in a share of import of chemical products (63.64) and figure 12 
represents that changes. 
 
Figure 12. Estonian import from Russia in million dollars ($) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the data from OEC (2019) 
Same changes in main items with Lithuania also provides an idea of structural 
changes in Estonian import from Russia. Once again, it is easy to notice that the peak of 
decrease in import numbers was in 2015 and since that year numbers went up. 
Data for Latvian import from Russia compiled by the author in appendix F. In a line 
with other countries of import analysis, insufficient items will be excluded. They are animal 
hides, animal products, arts and antiques, footwear and headwear, instruments, 
miscellaneous, paper goods, precious metals, stone and glass, textiles and weapons, which is 
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more than a half of all items. Looking on those which remained one can notice grow in wood 
products (201.17%) vegetable products (36.57%) and metals (11.52%). The author in a way 
of graph for visual representation compiled figure 13.
 
Figure 13. Latvian import from Russia in million dollars ($) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the data from OEC (2019) 
 In the case of Latvian import from Latvia, it is hard to confirm or deny structural 
changes after the implementation of sanctions. Based on the graph one can say those main 
items remained on the same level or even improved its positions, in the same time share of 
mineral products even with the decrease on – 42.05% still is higher than any other. The 
point is that a decrease in such an outstanding item for sure means structural changes for 
import. Also, There is a structural change in the decrease of a share of plastic and rubbers on 
-75.28%, which might be called significant as well. 
There are a couple of assumptions the author able to make after analysis of Baltic 
countries import from Russia. First of all, mineral products (gas, oil) playing an outstanding 
role in Russian import. According to Brown, (2019), no alternative for Baltic countries for 
gas and oil import put them in a vulnerable position, especially with the decrease of that 
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import. In the same time, EU sanctions on machines and technologies for oil and gas 
production might be a reason for that decrease. However, one should also take into account 
significant changes in oil prices in recent years. In order to visualize that information figure 
14 was compiled in a way of a graph. From 2013 (105.87 $ per barrel) prices went down 
more than twice up to 2016 (40.68 $ per barrel). That means sanctions are not the only reason 
for changes in trade between Russia and Baltic countries, other external factors also might 
take a place. 
 
Figure 14. The dynamics of average OPEC oil prices (in $ per barrel) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the data from Statista (2019) 
Another decrease is in transportation, from -59% and more, depends on the country. 
In the same time, one can notice a trend for the growth of a volume of wood products. All of 
it allows making an assumption of serious structural changes in Baltic countries import from 
Russia after the implementation of sanctions.  
Figure 15 was compiled by the author in a form of the histogram with grouping 
provides calculation regarding the trade balance of Baltic countries in a trade with Russia. 
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Figure 15. Trade balance of Baltic States in trade with Russia from 2013 to 2017 in billion 
dollars ($) 
Source: Compiled by the author based on the data from OEC (2019) 
It is easy to understand out of the figure than all 3 countries have a negative or passive 
trade balance. It means that the country depends on the import rather than on export. The 
passive trade balance is considered undesirable and is usually evaluated as a sign of the 
weakness of the foreign trade positions of the country. In the same time after the 
implementation of the sanctions trade balance for all Baltic countries starts to move from 
minus to zero. That means Baltic countries currently tries to decrease its vulnerability and to 
rearrange their trade connections with Russia in other directions.  
In connection of analysis with previous researches regarding the impact of sanctions 
on the Russian-Baltic trade, the author found out that currently, the situation is quite 
complicated for assessment. The analysis shows significant changes in a structure of Baltic 
countries import from Russia and in the same time minor changes in a structure of Baltic 
countries export to Russia. On the one hand, that indirectly confirms the idea of Changwei, 
Xiaojia, and Lu (2019), with the change of vector of Russian foreign trade. That means a 
decrease in trade between parties will procedure further on (Oxenstierna, 2018). On the other 
hand, statistics clearly show that the peak of a crisis in trade was already passed in 2015-2016 
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and the situation slowly start to improve. That goes directly with the article written by 
Fedorov (2018), which says that both parties will find out a solution for the existing situation 
as they have common interests in a region.  
Overall, after the comparative analysis author able to set up 2 opposite hypothesis. 
First one is that currently there is a strong impact of sanctions on trade between Russia and 
Baltics and because of it trade will go down further on in short-term perspective. Another one 
is that sanctions had a local effect on trade. Russia and Baltic countries already passed the 
breakeven point and numbers will go up further on from a short-term perspective. Both points 
of view have arguments for defense and, in order to choose final hypothesis, additional 
information strongly required. 
 
2.2 Case studies of the impact of sanctions on a Russian-Baltic trade 
Despite comparative analysis of statistics starts from the year before sanctions took a 
place in 2013 and understanding of a what are the key changes in the trade between Russia 
and the Baltic countries, author still have to answer second question, which was set up in 
theoretical part: what trade participants in Baltic and Russia should be ready for further on in 
a nearest future? Without answering this question, it is not enough data to choose a final 
hypothesis, that is why author decided than in order to collect additional information it is 
reasonable to receive opinions of people who directly related with trade in between Russia 
and Baltic. Another reason is to test results of a comparative analysis of impact of sanctions 
on a Russia-Baltic trade. 
The author will proceed to the qualitative part of the research. Namely, the goal is to 
conduct 5 extended interviews with the executives of firms that operate on this trade route. 
Again, taking the approach of an interview with the representatives of companies who works 
in this field was not yet done by any of the papers mentioned in this work.  
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Possible flows of such work could include the lack of views collected from the 
interviews. Since the author would like to conduct full-scale interviews that should last over 
15 min and longer, it would not be feasible to collect a large number of those within the 
limited period given. 
The questions asked during the interview were concerned regarding comparing of the 
statistical data to the real numbers, companies’ perceptions about the situation on a market, 
Influence of political decisions on a market and companies itself and further predictions 
regarding this situation and what possibilities does the business have in these terms. 
Appendix G is a sample of interview structure, which was made by the author.  
First theme of an interview is personal information, aimed to describe a person of 
interview. Those questions are regarding duties of a interviewee and his position in a 
company. Names of interviews will be substituted on a interview 1,2,3 and so on as some 
respondents do not agree to share this sensitive information. Some questions in this group 
aimed to measure how deep that person opinion represents company vectors and ideas. The 
point is that for example customer support agents are not able to provide reliable information 
regarding further plans of a company development. Questions regarding gender and age made 
in order to see demography of a respondents. 
Second topic is questions related with statistics and current situation in a Russian-
Baltic trade. Those group of question in general represents the company. The idea is to stress 
results of comparative methods. One can also define how each company related with Russia-
Baltic trade in that part. Author separated questions regarding company and market in general 
to avoid situation where results might be interpreted too narrow or too broad.  
Last group of questions is related with further predictions regarding situation. Those 
predictions based on questions regarding further plans of a company for development. Also 
regarding how important authors consider the impact of sanctions on a trade in region. This 
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part is rather personal perceptions of interviews, based on experience in trade between Russia 
and Baltic sea countries.  
The interview will allow the author to evaluate the reality of after-the-sanctions trade 
from the business players who had perceived the impact of sanctions in their day-to-day 
working environment. It also helps to answer the question, which was arise previously. And 
as an outcome to choose one final hypothesis for the thesis.  
In order to present information regarding interviewees  
Interviewee Age Sex Country Company Position Interview 
length 
Interview 
date 
Interviewee 1 62 Male Latvia Alpha Osta Owner 16 min 
50 sec 
21.04 
Interviewee 2 40 Male Latvia ADM 
Baltic 
Tranzits 
Director 
(CEO) 
39 min 22.04 
Interviewee 3 31 Male Estonia WASTERE
FINERY 
OÜ 
Director 
(CEO) 
18 min 
33 sec 
15.04 
Interviewee 4 27 Male Estonia APL 
agencies 
Estonia OÜ 
Team 
leader of 
customer 
support  
19 min 
21 sec 
06.05 
Interviewee 5 28 Male Russia Siemens 
Russia 
Specialist 
of press-
center 
20 min 
15 sec 
30.04 
Source: compiled by author 
 What can be noticed from the table is that there are no representatives from 
Lithuania. That might become a minor gap in the collaboration of data from the interviews 
and statistics. In the same time author, assume that views from 3 countries out of 4 countries 
which involved in trade between Russia and Baltic countries, will cover the whole topic. This 
goes in a line with the finding from the comparative analysis, that Russian export to Lithuania 
and Estonia are quite similar.  
Answers of interviewees were combined together and presented in the form of a table 
in appendix H. Regarding the current situation in the field of trade between Russia and Baltic 
countries almost all informants went in line with statistical data. To be more precise, the 
44 
 
 
statistical drop in Baltic countries import from Russia as well as a decrease in export of Baltic 
countries to Russia were confirmed. In the same time, looking back to theoretical part one 
can stress article wrote by Veebel and Markus (2018), as author received confirmation from 
informants that drop in one sector of trade (transportation) leads to drop in others as well 
(chemical, vegetable) and in that line sanctions had a significant effect on the trade in region.  
Another important message from Theme 2 of interviews is that in current situation 
companies both in Baltic countries as well as in Russia working on rearrangement on other 
markets. Especially important in that line information received from interviewee 4 as his 
company works both in Baltic states and Russia. While Baltic companies searching for 
entrance on other EU countries markets, Russian companies searching for entrance on Asian 
markets.  This goes against article wrote by Zygimantas (2014), that Baltic countries would 
have problems with rearrangement on other markets due to a weak competitive position. 
However, one could say that the article was written 5 years ago, and for that time Baltic 
countries were able to resolve its issue either by investigation of new markets or 
improvement of competitive position. 
Theme 3 was related to the question of what trade participants in Baltic and Russia 
should be ready for further on in the future.  First of all, the author noticed that several 
respondents opinions go along with the article wrote by Kovalev, Falchenko & Savelyeva 
(2019). The point is that the question of cancellation of sanction currently depends on the will 
of the Russian government. Despite its related with the topic of a thesis indirectly, one also 
can notice that according to respondents’ Russian producers currently have a great 
opportunity for the development and a chance to replace import products from other 
countries. The way how it is related with the thesis is that indirectly it confirms the idea of 
Nureev and Petrakov (2016) that current situation in perspective is a threat for the 
development of the trade in the region.  
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The author also noticed differences between local Baltic companies and international 
companies. Despite all the companies, consider sanctions as a threat, international companies 
measure their impact less strong than local. The reason behind is that international companies 
have an ability for other entrance on a Russian market, besides Baltic countries, which 
provides them more visible opportunities and perspectives on contrast with local ones. 
Once the question of further perspectives was set up, based on interviews Author able 
to say that companies in Baltic mostly planning or already started to expand on other markets. 
Reasons behind are that entrepreneurs do not really see any possibilities for the development 
of trade between Russia and Baltic countries, at least in a short-term perspective. That 
information actually declines the article wrote be Fedorov (2018) and in the same time goes 
along with the article wrote by Oxenstierna (2018) which says that trade in a region will go 
down in the perspective with the decline of the importance of that trade for both parties.  
Finally, one can combine theory from Oxenstemania, Kashparov and Smirnova and 
Brown, with the results from the comparative analysis, which confirms structural changes in 
trade inside the region and qualitative research which rejects opposite hypothesis based on 
the idea wrote by Fedorov (2018). In that line, Author in that bachelor thesis confirmed 
hypothesis that currently there is a strong impact of sanctions on trade between Russia and 
Baltics and because of it trade will go down further on in a short-term perspective. As for 
those findings that go against that hypothesis, the author assume them as an exception from 
the current situation that also should be taken into account while the assessment of an 
existing situation. However, the author truly believes that a pragmatic analysis of Russian-
Baltic trade by both parties will lead to a positive dynamic in the mutual dialogue from a 
long-term perspective. 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
 
Conclusion 
Looking back on the aim of this Bachelor thesis, the analyses demonstrate that Baltic-
Russian trade is considerably declined after the sanctions were established. It is possible to 
say that that decline had a combined effect, but one can not deny that sanctions played their 
role. The biggest decline could be seen in those trade sectors that are under EU sanctions or 
Russian contra-sanctions. Overall, that confirms the idea that sanctions are a natural barrier 
for any development of trade.  
At present, the stability of a state is determined by the level of development of its 
economy, therefore the restriction of trade ties makes sanctions a powerful instrument of 
influence. On the other hand, the state on which sanctions are imposed has the opportunity to 
embark on the path of economic development based on internal resources, adopting 
appropriate development programs. 
Sanctions in the Russian-Baltic trade sector clearly shows that sanctions by itself 
might take different forms depends on the reasons behind them and from the purposes they 
applied for. It also should be taken into account, that sanctions were not a separate shock 
event but a bundle of actions of EU countries and backward actions from Russia. Those 
actions have a lasting effect due to recent changes in sanctions that were already applied and 
implementation of new restrictions. 
The author in this bachelor thesis fulfills the gap in previous researches regarding this 
topic, as there are not enough researchers regarding the impact of sanctions on a Russian-
Baltic trade separately from the impact of sanctions on a Russian-EU trade. One should admit 
that despite sanctions of Baltic countries is the part of EU sanctions applied to Russia and 
Russian contra-sanctions applied to all EU countries, in the same time impact of those 
sanctions on trade between Russia and Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should be measured 
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separately from the whole EU. The idea behind is different key elements of trade for each 
country. 
Once again, data from the statistics leads to several conclusions and they are quite 
different from each other, or even controversial. One conclusion is a strong impact of 
sanctions on trade between Russia and Baltics and because of it, trade volume will continue 
to fall in the short-term perspective. Another one is that sanctions had a local effect on trade. 
Russia and Baltic countries already passed the breakeven point in that crisis and numbers will 
go up further on. 
In that line that case studies (interviews) conducted from representatives of companies 
with the real experience regarding this topic is so important. Such an approach for the 
collection of information from the first hand supports statistical analyses and gives an 
opportunity to see a broader situation. 
What could be assumed based on both interviews and statistics is that Russian 
government expects that current situation will open up new horizons and prospects for the 
development of key sectors of the Russian economy, which can be achieved through 
overcoming various obstacles to the development of domestic production of necessary 
products, technologies, components, and equipment.  
In their turn, business in both Baltic countries and Russia decided to rearrange its 
trade connections to other markets, as the existing situation cannot be resolved at once, as 
there is a strong impact of sanctions on trade between Russia and Baltics and because of it 
trade will go down further on in a short-term perspective. In the same time, the current 
decline in trade does not mean the end of the dialogue between countries and moreover, 
might mean that further steps of both parties regarding trade between Russia and Baltic 
countries are still not decided. All these refer to the idea that the economic aspect of an 
existing situation will dominate on a political further on but only in a long-term perspective. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A 
 
Structural changes in Estonia exports to Russia after sanction implementation 
 
Items Years Changes in % 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  
Animal and vegetable bi-products 16.6 18.4 6.25 3.19 23.5 41.57% 
Animal hides 68.7 34 11.6 8.52 5.76 -91.62% 
Animal products 92.1 37.4 1.35 1.88 1.54 -98.33% 
Arts and atiques 0.135 0.44 0.162 0.575 2.42 1692.59% 
Chemical products 260 248 143 132 188 -27.69% 
Foodstuffs 343 359 235 205 202 -41.11% 
Footwear and headwear 50.1 26.6 7.11 19.9 17.4 -65.27% 
Instruments 72.9 71.4 31.5 43.3 48.1 -34.02% 
Machines 842 1210 429 489 686 -18.53% 
Metals 95.9 84 55.4 63.9 69.8 -27.22% 
Mineral products 48.7 31 19.5 6.33 4.89 -89.96% 
Miscellaneous 96.8 53.8 42 45.7 35.3 -63.53% 
Paper goods 42 18.3 11.9 11.5 9.16 -78.19% 
Plastics and rubbers 152 189 102 47 55.9 -63.22% 
Precious metals 2.04 2.28 0.847 1.43 0.344 -83.14% 
Stone and glass 28.5 16.5 9.83 5.86 6.43 -77.44% 
Textiles 352 135 57.7 74.9 51.9 -85.26% 
Transportation 96.3 112 47.8 88 41.1 -57.32% 
Vegetable products 15.7 16.2 11.3 12.1 11.1 -29.30% 
Weapons 3.24 2.62 1.51 0.26 1.03 -68.21% 
Wood products 17.4 10.7 5.38 3.98 4.48 -74.25% 
Notes: Items measured in million dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by author based on data collected from OEC (2019) 
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Appendix B 
 
Structural changes in Latvia exports to Russia after sanction implementation 
 
Items Years Changes in % 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  
Animal and vegetable bi-products 0.817 0.603 0.373 0.181 0.902 10.40% 
Animal hides 3.83 3.24 2.37 2.27 2.31 -39.69% 
Animal products 46.6 44.8 0.419 0.244 0.239 -99.49% 
Arts and antiques 0.287 0.364 0.199 0.798 0.474 65.16% 
Chemical products 161 126 81.5 110 131 -18.63% 
Foodstuffs 496 488 258 213 376 -24.19% 
Footwear and headwear 6.43 4.51 1.71 2.01 2.08 -67.65% 
Instruments 20.4 16.6 33.8 28.3 17.6 -13.73% 
Machines 251 232 183 165 224 -10.76% 
Metals 38.7 29.3 21.6 29.4 34.1 -11.89% 
Mineral products 31.6 33 19.5 2.05 2.25 -92.88% 
Miscellaneous 22 20.7 10.2 13.3 11.5 -47.73% 
Paper goods 44.6 37.4 25.3 19.8 23.6 -47.09% 
Plastics and rubbers 70 71.9 49.8 50.1 53.8 -23.14% 
Precious metals 10.6 9.86 9.65 7.88 7.29 -31.23% 
Stone and glass 28 21.3 11.3 10.9 10.3 -63.21% 
Textiles 45.1 33.4 18.4 24.4 37.3 -17.29% 
Transportation 74.7 32.6 16.6 21.2 29.7 -60.24% 
Vegetable products 39.4 36.1 35.4 22.2 28.4 -27.92% 
Weapons 0.145 0.142 0.159 0.169 0.066 -54.48% 
Wood products 48.3 44.8 11.9 3.56 3.9 -91.93% 
Notes: Items measured in million dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by author based on data collected from OEC (2019) 
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Appendix C 
 
Structural changes in Lithuania exports to Russia after sanction implementation 
 
Items Years Changes in % 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  
Animal and vegetable bi-products 6.75 6.33 3.4 8.88 10.5 55.56% 
Animal hides 24.1 25.4 15.6 12 12.2 -49.38% 
Animal products 272 187 11.2 3.85 3.84 -98.59% 
Arts and antiques 1.33 0.477 0.769 2.39 2.62 96.99% 
Chemical products 207 252 241 237 346 67.15% 
Foodstuffs 317 379 224 157 308 -2.84% 
Footwear and headwear 54.7 39.8 18.6 16.9 22.3 -59.23% 
Instruments 102 173 117 113 143 40.20% 
Machines 812 1350 639 573 835 2.83% 
Metals 151 122 81.4 85.8 136 -9.93% 
Mineral products 39.1 27.1 35.7 14.2 11.8 -69.82% 
Miscellaneous 143 144 81.2 84.5 80.4 -43.78% 
Paper goods 94.9 83.5 46.8 48 46.6 -50.90% 
Plastics and rubbers 158 147 91.4 98.2 127 -19.62% 
Precious metals 1.09 1.08 1.15 0.899 1.41 29.36% 
Stone and glass 73.8 65.2 43.2 35.7 45.1 -38.89% 
Textiles 207 238 133 137 154 -25.60% 
Transportation 465 234 61.1 80.5 179 -61.51% 
Vegetable products 743 492 192 115 115 -84.52% 
Weapons 0.278 0.138 0.062 0.022 0.026 -90.65% 
Wood products 40.2 29.6 18 12.8 15 -62.69% 
Notes: Items measured in million dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by author based on data collected from OEC (2019) 
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Appendix D 
 
Structural changes in Lithuania imports from Russia after sanction implementation 
 
Items Years Changes in % 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  
Animal and vegetable bi-products 52.4 51.9 31 32.8 37.5 -28.44% 
Animal hides 0.258 0.636 0.797 0.478 0.881 241.47% 
Animal products 10 9.4 18.7 32.4 28.3 183.00% 
Arts and antiques 0.006 0.026 0.003 0.043 0.149 2383.33% 
Chemical products 323 265 264 180 194 -39.94% 
Foodstuffs 44.6 44.6 24.4 33.6 25.2 -43.50% 
Footwear and headwear 0.827 0.846 0.3 0.384 0.509 -38.45% 
Instruments 11.7 6.3 7.76 6.25 5.01 -57.18% 
Machines 84.3 82.8 53.9 35.6 53.5 -36.54% 
Metals 145 116 99.9 136 166 14.48% 
Mineral products 7980 6250 3490 2740 2800 -64.91% 
Miscellaneous 8.48 10.2 7.02 9.92 7.51 -11.44% 
Paper goods 24 24.2 23.3 22.9 28.1 17.08% 
Plastics and rubbers 78.8 93.1 66.7 76.8 83.8 6.35% 
Precious metals 1.25 1.72 4.89 15.1 28.3 2164.00% 
Stone and glass 14 18 15.8 15 19.4 38.57% 
Textiles 6.73 8.13 9.35 8.4 6.29 -6.54% 
Transportation 214 202 231 41.5 25.4 -88.13% 
Vegetable products 31.9 27.1 41.7 35.9 37.8 18.50% 
Weapons 0.134 0.003 0.003 0 0 -100.00% 
Wood products 38.1 51 52.8 69.4 79.4 108.40% 
Notes: Items measured in million dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by author based on data collected from OEC (2019) 
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Appendix E 
 
Structural changes in Estonia imports from Russia after sanction implementation 
 
Items Years Changes in % 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  
Animal and vegetable bi-products 4.09 1.83 2.15 0.742 1.12 -72.62% 
Animal hides 5.48 4.58 1.18 0.51 0.418 -92.37% 
Animal products 6.96 6.47 7.98 8.18 6.74 -3.16% 
Arts and antiques 0.825 0.122 0.015 0.56 0.048 -94.18% 
Chemical products 187 287. 251 257 306 63.64% 
Foodstuffs 13 14.8 9.52 18 13.6 4.62% 
Footwear and headwear 2.22 0.621 0.44 0.553 0.537 -75.81% 
Instruments 1.42 4.51 1.45 1.51 2.31 62.68% 
Machines 75.7 64.5 65.5 36.1 27.1 -64.20% 
Metals 193 139 139 138 167 -13.47% 
Mineral products 2540 2490 1310 965 931 -63.35% 
Miscellaneous 4.43 3.41 4.28 4.63 6.35 43.34% 
Paper goods 12.3 15.8 17.1 18.2 23 86.99% 
Plastics and rubbers 20.3 18 15.9 14 17.5 -13.79% 
Precious metals 0.9 1.48 1.16 1.52 2.02 124.44% 
Stone and glass 11.9 11.4 11.6 15.3 20.1 68.91% 
Textiles 4.94 3.13 2.51 3.65 6.11 23.68% 
Transportation 298 42.7 9.76 38.5 91.8 -69.19% 
Vegetable products 5.79 3.21 4.1 6.24 4.09 -29.36% 
Weapons 1.06 0.546 0.895 0.974 1.31 23.58% 
Wood products 141 156 129 133 149 5.67% 
Notes: Items measured in million dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by author based on data collected from OEC (2019) 
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Appendix F 
 
Structural changes in Latvia imports from Russia after sanction implementation 
 
Items Years Changes in % 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017  
Animal and vegetable bi-products 42.8 37.2 23.1 12 16.2 -62.15% 
Animal hides 18.3 16.4 2.18 0.047 2.4 -86.89% 
Animal products 0.241 0.01 0.163 0.064 0.356 47.72% 
Arts and antiques 0.025 0.004 0.014 0.01 53.1 112.00% 
Chemical products 186 179 155 133 173 -6.99% 
Foodstuffs 55.9 66.7 43.8 49.7 51.9 -7.16% 
Footwear and headwear 0.987 3.65 0.243 0.331 0.348 -64.74% 
Instruments 6.61 7.31 6.63 3.15 5.67 -14.22% 
Machines 40.1 31.4 48 51.5 38.8 -3.24% 
Metals 269 254 244 224 300 11.52% 
Mineral products 1950 2050 1210 855 1130 -42.05% 
Miscellaneous 2.26 3.32 3.29 4.28 5.07 124.34% 
Paper goods 19.7 21 20.5 19.4 17.9 -9.14% 
Plastics and rubbers 71.6 26.8 26.7 15.8 17.7 -75.28% 
Precious metals 9.43 11.7 12.2 9.59 9.35 -0.85% 
Stone and glass 12.4 14 11.8 14.7 19.1 54.03% 
Textiles 9.14 7.08 3.75 3.94 11.8 29.10% 
Transportation 52.7 58.5 21.6 14.7 21.6 -59.01% 
Vegetable products 30.9 94.7 93.7 60.4 42.2 36.57% 
Weapons 0.009 0.018 0.046 0.128 0.131 1355.56% 
Wood products 34.2 59.9 72.8 91.5 103 201.17% 
Notes: Items measured in million dollars ($) 
Source: compiled by author based on data collected from OEC (2019) 
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Appendix G 
 
Interview plan 
 
Interviewer:  
Interview date:  
Interview length:  
Interviewee 
Company:  
Position: 
 
Theme 1 (personal info) 
We can start. First of all, I would like to say thank you that you find some free time for this 
interview. And let me explain the main idea of that interview. 
1. Would it be alright if I recorded our talk? The file will only be used in respect to the 
Bachelor thesis and will not be distributed in public. 
2. Could you present your name, surname as well as the name of the company? 
3. Could you describe the company your work in? 
4. For how many years you working in the company? 
5. Could you describe your duties in the company? 
Theme 2 (Statistics) 
1. Could you describe how is your company connected with Russia Baltic trade 
2. Could you give precise numbers regarding trade with Russia?  
3. Could you comment on data, dynamics 
4. What you can say about changes from 2014? 
5. Do the company have to rearrange its connections in terms of trade after sanctions? 
Theme 3 (Further predictions) 
1. What are your predictions regarding further development? 
2. Do the company plan to expand in terms of Russia Baltic trade or change its vector? 
3. You consider sanctions as a threat or an opportunity? 
4. What are your predictions regarding sanctions? 
5. How the market should react? 
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Appendix H 
Combined table for interviewees responds 
 
Theme Question 
(briefly) 
 
 Interviewee’s 
respond 
 
  Alpha 
Osta 
ADM 
Baltic 
Tranzits 
 
Siemens 
Russia 
APL 
Estonia 
WasteRefi
nery 
Theme 2 
Current 
situation 
Reason for 
changes in 
trade 
Sanctions Sanctions Sanctions Sanctions Sanctions 
 Company 
role in a 
Russia-
Baltic 
trade  
Chemical 
products, 
Vegetable 
products 
(Import 
from 
Russia) 
Transporta
tion 
(Logistics 
to Russia) 
Machines, 
Instrument
s, 
Transporta
tion 
(Company 
uses Baltic 
ports for 
trade with 
Russia) 
Transporta
tion 
(Logistics 
to and/or 
from 
Russia) 
Mineral 
products 
(Oil 
import 
from 
Russia) 
 Changes 
on a 
market 
after 2014 
Significant 
drop due 
to drop on 
a 
transportat
ion market 
Significant 
drop due 
to 
legislation 
barriers 
Legislatio
n barriers 
for export 
of 
machines 
and 
technologi
es 
Rearrange
ment of 
trade roots 
after 2014 
Significant 
drop 
Due to 
additional 
taxation 
and 
barriers 
 Structural 
changes in 
a company 
after 2014 
Rearrange 
of 
company 
from 
chemical 
products 
import to 
vegetable 
products  
Company 
rearrange 
to 
Ukrainian 
market  
Company 
decided to 
move 
production 
lines for 
Russian 
market to 
Russia 
No 
significant 
changes 
related to 
Russian-
Baltic 
trade 
Company 
have to 
minimize 
its 
expenditur
es, made 
reduction 
of 
employees 
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 Precise 
numbers 
in a 
current 
changes 
8 to 9 mln 
of tones in 
2013 and 
after 0.7-1 
mln of 
tones  
More than 
100 of 
wagon per 
month, 
now there 
are around 
15  
Company 
aim is to 
have 100% 
local 
production 
lines in 
Russia up 
to 2013 
Company 
become a 
part of 
CMA-
CGM 
company 
in 2016 
and today 
is the 3 
largest 
company 
in 
container 
transportat
ion and 
shipping 
Current 
profit is 3 
times 
lower than 
in the 
2013 
Theme 3 
(Future 
predictions
) 
Political 
threat or 
economic? 
Economic Economic Economic Economic Economic 
 Threat or 
the 
opportunit
y? 
Threat 
only as 
opportuniti
es are 
rather 
small 
Threat and 
in the 
same time 
an 
opportunit
y but not 
for all 
Threat 
which 
leads to 
extra 
losses 
For such a 
company 
current 
situation is 
both a 
threat and 
an 
opportunit
y but not 
significant 
Sanctions 
force to 
search for 
opportuniti
es 
 Further 
predictions 
regarding 
sanctions? 
In a long-
term 
sanctions 
will be 
cancelled 
due to 
economic 
reason 
Sanction 
regime 
might 
exist for a 
long 
period of 
time as 
political 
decisions 
affects 
Company 
do not 
expect 
cancellatio
n of 
sanctions 
in a short-
term 
If the 
sanctions 
will not be 
cancelled 
in a 
nearest 
future, 
business 
will find a 
way to 
overcome 
them 
Sanctions 
cancellatio
ns depends 
on 
political 
decisions 
of Russian 
goverment 
 Further 
company 
plans  
Project of 
a new 
elevator 
Will stay 
on the 
Expansion 
on a new 
markets 
In general 
company 
currently 
in a 
process of 
restructura
Developm
ent of 
Japan 
Russia 
Expansion 
on a new 
markets 
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existing 
market 
tion, plans 
for local 
product 
lines and 
services in 
Russia  
Express 
(JRX)  
 Further 
predictions 
regarding 
trade in a 
region 
Trade 
between 
Russia and 
Baltic 
countries 
will go 
down 
further on 
due to lack 
of space 
for the 
developme
nt 
In a short 
term there 
is no 
perspectiv
es in a 
Russian-
Baltuc 
trade due 
to 
rearrange
ment of 
both 
parties its 
trade 
connection
s  
For a 
company 
trade 
between 
Russia and 
Baltic are 
not 
crucial, 
once local 
production 
lines in 
Russia will 
be settled, 
there will 
be no need 
for the use 
of Baltic 
ports.  
As port of 
Muuga is 
ice-free, 
on a 
contrast 
with 
Russian 
ports on a 
Baltic, 
trade will 
exists even 
under the 
sanctions, 
however 
the 
volume 
will be 
lower 
Hard to 
predict 
which 
sectors of 
trade will 
go up or 
down but 
in general 
trade 
barriers 
might be 
minimized 
but in a 
long term.  
Notes. Full questions presented in Appendix G 
Source: compiled by author 
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